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ABSTRACT
Environmental regulations can only be effective if they are adhered to, but the mo-
tivations for regulatory compliance are not always clear. We assessed vessel operator
compliance with a December 2008 regulation aimed at reducing collisions with
the endangered North Atlantic right whale that requires vessels 65 feet or greater
in length to travel at speeds of 10 knots or less at prescribed times and locations
along the U.S. eastern seaboard. Extensive outreach efforts were undertaken to
notify affected entities both before and after the regulation went into effect. Vessel
speeds of 201,862 trips made between November 2008 and August 2013 by 8,009
individual vessels were quantified remotely, constituting a nearly complete cen-
sus of transits made by the regulated population. Of these, 437 vessels (or their
parent companies), some of whom had been observed exceeding the speed limit,
were contacted through one of four non-punitive information programs. A fraction
(n = 26vessels/companies)receivedcitationsandfines.Despitetheeffortstoinform
mariners, initial compliance was low (<5% of the trips were completely <10 knots)
but improved in the latter part of the study. Each notification/enforcement program
improved compliance to some degree and some may have influenced compliance
across the entire regulated community. Citations/fines appeared to have the greatest
influence on improving compliance in notified vessels/companies, followed in order
of effectiveness by enforcement-office information letters, monthly summaries of
vesseloperations,anddirectat-searadiocontact.Tripsbycargovesselsexhibitedthe
greatest change in behavior followed by tanker and passenger vessels. These results
have application to other regulatory systems, especially where remote monitoring is
feasible,andanysettingwhereregulatorycomplianceissought.
Subjects Conservation Biology, Marine Biology
Keywords Regulatory compliance, Vessel collisions, Ship strikes, Endangered whales, Remote
monitoring, Large whale conservation, Vessel operations
INTRODUCTION
Natural resource conservation and management can take numerous forms, including
throughenvironmentalregulations.However,environmentalregulationsareonlyeffective
if they are adhered to. A substantial body of socio-legal and economic literature has been
devoted to the subject of regulatory compliance, but the factors that motivate individuals
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Compliance case studies have involved industrial pollution (Kagan, Gunningham &
Thornton, 2011), hazardous waste (Stafford, 2012), agricultural practices (Winter & May,
2001), forestry (Purdy, 2010; Peterson & Diss-Torrance, 2012), fisheries (Hønneland, 1999;
Ali & Abdullah, 2010), and endangered species conservation (Langpap, 2006; Innes &
Frisvold,2009),amongothers.
Some studies concluded that regulated communities may lack an understanding of
the requirements or may lack the willingness or capacity to comply (Burby & Paterson,
1993;Brehm&Hamilton,1996);othersfoundthatregulatedentitiesmayavoidcomplying
because the consequences of noncompliance (i.e., enforcement actions) rarely outweigh
the economic benefits of business as usual (Winter & May, 2001; Tyler, 2006). However,
in many regulatory settings, limited resources may restrict enforcement actions and
assessments of compliance to infrequent inspections (e.g., site visits), surveys, interviews,
or self-reporting (Winter & May, 2001; Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, 2004; Gray &
Shimshack,2011).
With regard to living marine resources, including endangered large whale protective
measures, risk assessment estimates have been conducted (van der Hoop, Vanderlaan
& Taggart, 2012; Redfern et al., 2013). But, there is also a need to ensure large whale
conservationregulationsaremeetingtheirobjectivesthroughcompliance.
The problem of vessel collisions with large whales
Hundreds of fatal vessel collisions (or “strikes”) with large whales have been reported,
worldwide (Laist et al., 2001; Van Waerebeek et al., 2007). In fact, the actual number
of strikes is likely far greater than the reported number because many go undetected
or unreported. Collisions with ships are a serious threat to the recovery of the highly
depletedNorthAtlanticrightwhale(Eubalaena glacialis)(Krausetal.,2005)andcollisions
alongwithincidentalentanglementincommercialfishinggear,haveretardedtherecovery
of this species (NMFS, 2005). A link has been established between vessel speed and the
likelihood of death of a vessel-struck whale whereby the probability of death of a whale
involved in a collision increases as vessel speed increases (Vanderlaan & Taggart, 2007;
Conn&Silber,2013).
To address the threat to the recovery of the North Atlantic right whale, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) issued regulations in November 2008 requiring all vessels 65 feet (19.8 m) and
greaterinlengthtotravelat10knotsorlessinareaswhereNorthAtlanticrightwhalesand
highvesseldensityco-occur(NMFS,2008).Theseareas,calledseasonalmanagementareas
(SMA),arelocatedalongtheeastcoastoftheU.S.Atlanticseaboardandareactiveforfixed
periods of the year that correspond with seasonal North Atlantic right whale migration,
feeding, calving and nursery activities (Fig. 1). The regulations are broad in geographic
scope and affect a substantial number of entities, including nearly all tanker, cargo
(e.g., container ships, vehicle transport vessels), passenger vessels, and ferries engaged
ininternationalanddomestictransportofgoodsandpeopleenteringmajorU.S.ports.
Silber et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.399 2/17Figure 1 Map depicting the location and active periods of the north Atlantic right whale seasonal
managementareas(SMAs).
Notifying the affected community
Extensive efforts by a number of agencies were made—both prior to the regulations going
into effect and on an ongoing basis while they were in effect—to notify the affected
community about the speed regulations that included an array of broadcast, print, and
electronic media outlets (Appendix S1; Silber & Bettridge, 2012). Knowledge of, and
adherence to, the requirements, precautions, and safety-at-sea provisions contained in a
number of the print and broadcast notification outlets (e.g., U.S. Coast Pilot publications,
Broadcast Notice to Mariners) is mandatory for any vessel sailing in U.S. waters. Most
vessels studied here are engagedin regular and periodic domestic and international routes
that would have resulted in repeated exposure to notification about the speed regulations.
Given the breadth of the notification efforts, we believe vessel operators should have had
ampleknowledgeoftherequirements.
Compliance information and enforcement programs
After the restrictions went into effect, a subset of the regulated vessel operators or their
companies received notifications and/or citations/fines under one of the information
and/or enforcement programs described below when violations of the rule were detected.
The programs were independently developed and carried out by four federal entities: two
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States Coast Guard (USCG) and NMFS’s Office of Protected Resources (OPR). There was
no standardization or coordination between programs regarding protocols for notifying
particular vessels/companies or the identity of operators being contacted. Each of these
programs/activities is described immediately below in the chronological order in which
theywerefirstimplemented.
Hailing at-sea
In four periods during the first five years of the regulations (February–May
2009, January–July 2010, November 2010–July 2011, and January–March
2012), USCG personnel radioed vessels that were observed (detected via
radar, Automatic Identification System (AIS), and/or visually) violating the
speed restrictions and requested that the vessels slow to appropriate speeds.
It was the only program involving real-time, verbal notification. It was also somewhat
limitedinscope,havingbeenconductedinonlysixof10SMAs(theGreatSouthChannel,
RacePoint,CapeCodBay,Philadelphia,Norfolk,andNorthCarolinatoGeorgia)andonly
whenUSCGcutterswereonroutinepatrolsorengagedinothermissions.
Community oriented policing and problem solving (COPPS) letters
As part of its Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS) Program,
NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) sent a total of 85 letters between September
2009 and January 2010 to companies whose vessel operators were determined by OLE
agents (based on AIS data analysis) to have made at least one trip in an SMA that far
exceededthe10-knotlimit.Theletterswereinformativeratherthanpunitive,andincluded
detailed information regarding the observed violation(s) and a reminder about the speed
restrictions.
Notice of violation and assessment of civil penalties (NOVA)
To prosecute violations of the Endangered Species Act, NOAA’s Office of General Counsel
Enforcement Section can issue a Notice of Violation and Assessment of civil penalties
(NOVA). A NOVA charges the respondent with a violation of laws and regulations,
and assesses a civil monetary penalty in accordance with the agency’s penalty policy for
that violation (http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/031611 penalty policy.pdf). Limited
staff time required that attention be focused on a small number of vessels that exhibited
numerous and flagrant breaches of the speed restrictions (as indicated by AIS), even
though hundreds of violations were observed. Multiple offending trips were often cited in
the NOVAs and fines were cumulative. Depending on the number of violations, penalties
ranged from $5,750 to $92,000 (mean = $21,845) (www.gc.noaa.gov/enforce-office3.
html).Atotalof28NOVAswereissuedbetweenNovember2010andSeptember2012(and
used to examine recipients’ operations described below): seven in November 2010; two in
December 2010 (those issued in November and December 2010 were defined as “season
3”forourpurposes);eightinNovember2011(season4);oneinJuly2012;threeinAugust
2012; and seven in September 2012 (these latter three collectively were considered season
5).NOVAsissuedin2013werenotincludedinthisanalysis.
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In collaboration with the World Shipping Council (WSC) and Chamber of Shipping of
America (CSA), two industry trade associations that represent more than 90% of the
world’s international commercial shipping fleet, NMFS’s OPR developed a program
to disseminate AIS-based vessel operations information to WSC and CSA member
companies. A total of 17 shipping companies (13 WSC and 4 CSA members; ca. 400
vessels) participated in the program. Starting in December 2010, and monthly for
the duration of the study, OPR sent reports directly to company officials containing
spreadsheet summaries of every vessel transit within active SMAs (regardless of whether
the trip was compliant with the regulation) during the previous month which included:
vessel name; date/time of entry into the SMA; distance traveled within the SMA; speeds
whenenteringandexitingtheSMA;andthemeanandmaximumspeedswithintheSMA.
Study objectives
We sought to assess compliance by the regulated community by examining the response
to the vessel speed restrictions. Using a remote monitoring program that provided a
near-complete census of vessel operations, we quantified vessel operations in SMAs
during the first five years of the regulations. In addition to quantifying overall compliance
with the regulations, we assessed whether compliance with the regulations changed over
time and whether attempts to improve compliance through the targeted notification and
enforcementprogramsproducedachangeinbehavior.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Monitoring vessel operations
We examined vessel behavior using AIS data. AIS is a navigational safety system that
transmits very high frequency (VHF) radio signals several times each minute. Each
transmission contains static information specific to a given vessel which allowed us to
assess compliance by individual vessels and more generally by principal vessel types. The
signal also includes dynamic Global Positioning System-linked data unique to a particular
voyage including location, heading, and speed (Aarsæther & Moan, 2009). Functioning
AIS capabilities are required by the International Maritime Organization on all vessels
≥300grosstons,andtheUSCGrequiresAISonnearlyallvesselssailinginU.S.waters.The
USCG has established a national network of AIS receivers that provides coverage of nearly
all U.S. coastal waters, a continuously sampled record of operations and, for us, a nearly
complete census of the community subject to the speed limits. The AIS’s reporting rates
provided hundreds of records per trip and resulted in a large and rather precise record of
vesselspeedandoperations.
Assessing compliance
Using AIS data collected between November 1, 2008 and August 1, 2013, we analyzed all
trips by vessels ≥65 feet in length that were located within the geographic boundaries of
the SMAs (our analytical approach is described further in Silber & Bettridge, 2010). A trip
located in an active SMA was considered compliant if all speeds were ≤10 knots. Because
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responses to the regulations (e.g., vessel operators who were not fully compliant but may
have modified their behavior when travelling through active SMAs), we also calculated
the percent of total transit distance traveled within SMAs at speeds >10 knots (PDGT10),
andaveragespeedswhen alloraportionofthe tripexceeded10knots.Withthe exception
of the average speeds >10 knots metric, we did not calculate mean trip speeds because
AIS signals are transmitted at regular and frequent time intervals and, as such, slower
speeds are more heavily represented than higher speeds. PDGT10 is not influenced by
the distributions of speed values, provides a standard measure that is independent of trip
length or duration, and, along with average noncompliant speeds, allowed us to quantify
degreesofcompliance(ornoncompliance).
The above-mentioned metrics (compliance, PDGT10, and average noncompliant
speed) were quantified for vessels by type (vessel type analyses were limited to those
principally impacted by the regulations, which included cargo, tanker, and passenger), by
association with the different notification/enforcement programs (USCG Hailing At-Sea,
COPPs Letters, NOVA, WSC and CSA Monthly Summaries), before and after they had
received these notification/enforcement actions and for periods when the restrictions
were not in effect. Summary statistics were generated for each SMA active season, which
we define as beginning on the first day of November (coinciding with the opening of the
migratoryandcalvinggroundsSMAs)andendingonJuly31ofthefollowingyear(closing
oftheGreatSouthChannelSMA)(Fig.1).
Statistical modeling
The observational design of the study made it difficult to directly associate changes in
vessel behavior with any particular notification/enforcement program. The implementa-
tion of the suite of notification programs overlapped, confounding attempts to directly
implicate any one action in the reduction of vessel speed. As such, we were limited to
presentingsummarystatisticsforthevesselsassociatedwitheachnotification/enforcement
program.
We were, however, able to estimate the change in PDGT10 over time by examining the
differencesinitsmeanvalueacrossthesequenceoftheSMAactiveseasonsduringthefirst
five years of the speed restrictions. A natural statistical model to describe the distribution
of these values in a given season is the beta distribution, which is typically modeled as a
functionofscale(α)andshape(β)parameters:
f(x | α,β) =
Γ(α +β)
Γ(α).Γ(β)
xα−1(1−x)β−1.
We were interested in modeling the mean of this distribution (rather than the scale and
shape specified above), so we reparameterized the beta distribution in terms of a mean µ
andparameterν,whichweinterpretinformallyasa“samplesize”.Hereweusedthescaled
distance of each segment as this sample size parameter, so that segments are weighted
accordingtotheirlength;weincludedthescaleparameterasanunknowninthemodel,by
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α = µν
β = (1−µ)ν.
WeexpectedthemeanPDGT10tovarywithseveralfactors,includingthreevariablesof
interest:SMA,vesseltype,andseason.Thus,wemodeledµusingamixedeffectsmodel:
µijk = θi +ψj +φik
where θi is the mean for vessel type i,ψj is a random effect corresponding to SMA j, and
φik is the fixed effect of season k on vessel type i. The first season in any SMA (either
2008 or 2009, depending on the SMA’s location) is treated as the baseline; hence θ can be
interpretedasthemeaninthefirstseason,andφ theeffectofasubsequentseason,relative
to the first. It is these seasonal difference effects that are of primary interest. The random
effectψj wherej = 1...,Sismodeledas:
ψj ∼ N(0,τψ).
To account for individual variation not attributable to vessel type, season or SMA, we
alsoemployedarandomeffect,whichdrawsaθ valuefromanormaldistributionforeach
uniquevessel.
For each scale parameter in the model (τψ, τθ, τυ), we specified a half-Cauchy
distributionintheinversesquare-rootoftheparameter:
f(σ | β) =
2
πβ[1+(σ
β)2]
.
This results in a relatively diffuse, weakly-informative prior (after transforming by
τ = σ−2)thatiseasilyoverwhelmedbythedata(Gelman,2006).
Because typical at-sea speeds vary widely for the different vessel types, models were fit
foreachofthethreemostcommonvesseltypesinthedataset:cargo,tankerandpassenger
vessels. Model parameters were estimated using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methodsasprovidedbythePyMC(version2.3,Patil,Huard&Fonnesbeck,2010)software
package. Each model was run for 20,000 iterations, with the first 10,000 conservatively
discardedasburn-in,leaving10,000samplesforinference.Modelswerecheckedforlackof
convergence using the Gelman–Rubin statistic (Gelman & Rubin, 1992) and for lack of fit
usingposteriorpredictivechecks(Gelmanetal.,2003).
Our Bayesian logistic mixed-effects model generated estimates of the differences
among seasons for different vessel types across all SMAs, along with corresponding
measures of uncertainty, 95% posterior credible intervals. Intervals that include zero
may be interpreted as not statistically different from zero. Interpreting coefficients on
the inverse-logit scale is challenging, since the underlying function is non-linear. For a
given parameter value, the effect will be larger near the middle of the logistic curve (0.5),
where it is steepest, and smaller near the boundaries (0 and 1), where it is flat. Thus, it
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periodsbyallvessels(cargo,tanker,andpassenger)forthefirstfiveyearsofthespeedrestrictions.
Season SMAstatus Trips Vessels Compliancea PDGT10 Meannoncom-
pliantspeeda
Active 14907 1776 4.0 57.3 12.0
1
Inactive 25974 2401 1.7 83.4 14.3
Active 19439 2019 4.2 55.5 12.0
2
Inactive 22685 2065 2.3 83.2 14.3
Active 20782 2126 12.8 38.3 11.6
3
Inactive 21408 2202 2.3 81.8 14.1
Active 18339 2097 23.1 29.1 11.7
4
Inactive 20075 2092 2.1 80.9 14.1
Active 17927 2063 23.7 26.9 11.7
5
Inactive 20326 2068 2.9 79.5 14.1
Notes.
a Compliance and mean noncompliant speed for inactive SMA trips refer to trips with all speeds ≤10 knots and mean of
all speeds >10 knots, respectively.
is conventional to consider the upper bound on the parameter’s effect by estimating its
maximum influence. A useful rule of thumb is to divide the parameter value by four to
get an approximate upper bound on the effect. For example, the estimated median of the
difference between active periods 2 and 1 for cargo ships is −0.02, which corresponds to a
maximum drop of 0.09 in PDGT10 (from 0.50 to 0.41); by comparison, the median value
of−1.07forthedifferencebetweenactiveperiods5and1wouldtakeanexpectedPDGT10
valueof0.50downto0.16.
RESULTS
A total of 201,862 trips made by 8,009 individual vessels were analyzed. In the first two
active seasons of the speed restrictions (i.e., the regulated community’s initial response to
thenovelregulation),4.0%and4.2%ofthetripswerefullycompliantandPDGT10values
averaged 57.3% and 55.5%, respectively (Table 1; Fig. 2). In comparison, when speed
restrictions were not in effect during the first two years of the regulations, 1.7% and 2.3%
of the trips within the geographic boundaries of the SMAs were conducted entirely with
speeds≤10knotsandPDGT10valueswere83.4%and83.2%,respectively(Table1).
ThelargestresponseinPDGT10valuesovertimeamongthethreevesseltypesanalyzed
was for cargo ships (Table 2). The temporal effect of the second active season relative
to the first for this vessel class was significantly negative, with a median value of −0.02
(95% BCI[−0.06, 0.01]).This effect increased35-fold for thethird active seasonto−0.70
(−0.72,−0.66),dropped furtherinthe fourthactiveseason to−1.20(−1.24,−1.17),and
then to −1.07 (−1.11, −1.03) in the fifth active season. For tankers, there was a notable
drop in expected PDGT10 beginning in the third active season, with the median seasonal
difference dropping to −0.25 (−0.31, −0.18), and further to −0.48 (−0.54, −0.41) and
−0.62 (−0.69, 0.56) in seasons four and five, respectively (Table 2; Fig. 3). The change
in vessel speed for passenger vessels was less consistent, showing little change in the first
Silber et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.399 8/17Figure 2 Temporal changes in vessel speed restriction compliance metrics during the first five years
of the regulations for vessels associated with the different notification/enforcement programs. Com-
pliance metrics for all vessels analyzed are also included for comparison and NOVA recipients have been
further split based on when they received NOVAs (e.g. Season 3 NOVAs includes vessels that received
theirnoticesofviolationshortlybeforeoraftertheonsetofSeason3)tobetterillustratepotentialimpacts
associated with the enforcement action.
three active seasons (nominally higher in the third season) before becoming significantly
negative in the fourth and fifth active season (Table 2; Fig. 3). None of the three models
showed obvious lack of convergence, nor was there indication of lack of fit, based on the
resultsofposteriorpredictivechecks.
Of the notification programs studied, vessels hailed by the USCG seemingly exhibited
the smallest relative change in compliance following their notification (Table 3); and,
transits by this group subsequent to their notification were consistently higher than the
population as a whole (Fig. 2). The average PDGT10 values of COPPS letter recipients
decreased from 66.3% to 33.3% after being notified (Table 3), representing a clear but
modestresponsetotheprogram.
Vessels/companies that received NOVAs seemed to exhibit the greatest relative change
in fully compliant trips and average PDGT10 after being cited. Average PDGT10 values
went from 62.0% for trips prior to notification to 14.5% after fines were issued (Table 3).
Average PDGT10 values for NOVA and monthly summary (both WSC and CSA)
recipients declined in each successive active period following receipt of their respective
Silber et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.399 9/17Figure3 Temporalchangesinvesselspeedrestrictioncompliancemetricsduringthefirstfiveyearsof
theregulationsforthethreeprincipalvesseltypesanalyzed.Compliancemetricsforallvesselsanalyzed
are also included for comparison.
Table 2 Model-based estimates of seasonal differences in PDGT10 for cargo, tanker and passenger
vessels,alongwithposterior95%credibleintervals(highestposteriordensityintervals). Each param-
eter represents the expected difference in PDGT10 in a specified season, relative to the first season, on the
inverse-logit scale. Intervals that do not contain positive values are highlighted in bold.
Vesseltype Season Median Standarddeviation 95%HPDinterval
2 −0.02 0.001 (−0.06,0.01)
3 −0.70 0.001 (−0.74,−0.66)
4 −1.20 0.001 (−1.24,−1.17)
Cargo
5 −1.07 0.001 (−1.11,−1.03)
2 0.18 0.002 (0.11, 0.25)
3 −0.25 0.002 (−0.31,−0.18)
4 −0.48 0.002 (−0.54,−0.41)
Tanker
5 −0.62 0.002 (−0.69,−0.56)
2 0.12 0.008 (−0.07, 0.32)
3 0.25 0.006 (0.07, 0.41)
4 −0.56 0.007 (−0.74,−0.39)
Passenger
5 −0.48 0.007 (−0.65,−0.31)
enforcement/notification actions (Fig. 2). WSC monthly summary recipients made some
of the largest relative adjustments in behavior (second only to NOVA recipients) with
respect to full compliance (Table 3). Among the non-punitive programs, CSA monthly
summary recipients had the greatest number of fully compliant trips (55.6%) and lowest
averagePDGT10(12.3%)afterbeingnotified(Table3).
DISCUSSION
The U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) and related environmental legislation provide
ratherbroadagencydiscretionfordevelopingandimplementingconservationregulations.
However, without compliance, such regulations will be largely ineffective no matter how
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withnotification/enforcementprogramsbothbeforeandafterthenotification/enforcement.
Program Timing Trips Vesselsa Compliance PDGT10 Meannoncom-
pliantspeed
Before 964 46 4.9 70.3 13.2
At-sea hailing
After 1260 44 11.8 48.7 12.1
Before 1572 85 2.6 66.3 12.8
COPPs letter
After 2743 62 14.3 33.3 11.9
Before 2197 40 29.5 35.8 10.9
Monthly summary (CSA)
After 2119 30 55.6 12.3 10.6
Before 14203 317 3.3 51.7 11.8
Monthly summary (WSC)
After 19416 303 29.0 20.8 11.7
Before 1318 28 3.3 62.0 13.0
NOVA
After 562 14 40.4 14.5 11.7
Notes.
a Notallvesselswithtripspriorto(orassociatedwith)theinitiationoftheirrespectivenotification/enforcementprogram
made subsequent trips through active SMAs.
well they are designed or how important their mandates are perceived. In our study,
substantial modifications to normal practices were expected of a large, multi-national
communitytoanovelESA-promulgatedregulation.
We found that, while much of the regulated community responded when vessel speed
restrictions were instituted, a substantial number of trips were not in total compliance
and the 10-knot limit was routinely exceeded. This suggests that extensive initial and
ongoing efforts to inform the regulated community about the speed restrictions provided
no assurances that widespread compliance would necessarily follow, even though
this information was provided using virtually every available conventional maritime
communications system and requirements that mariners fully understand applicable
regulationswhilesailinginU.S.waters.Inaddition,non-punitivenotificationstoviolators
(i.e.,radiocontactatsea,COPPSletters)byrecognizedenforcementauthoritiesresultedin
onlymodestchangesincompliancerates.
Duetothenumberanddiversityofentitiesaffectedbythisrule,itispossiblethatseveral
years were needed for the community to incorporate speed limits into their operating
procedures. It is worth noting, for example, that some printed and broadcast information
about the restrictions may have become available to “foreign-flagged” vessels (a large
portion of ships entering U.S. ports) primarily after entering U.S. waters. However,
most commercial vessels studied here, including foreign-flagged vessels, are engaged in
repeated, scheduled routes and likely were exposed multiple times each year to broadcast
andbroadly-disseminatedinformationabouttherestrictions.
Our results indicate that in response to the restrictions vessel operators tended to
use speeds that while not always less than 10 knots for the duration of a transit were
nonetheless slower than they might otherwise use. At-sea speeds typically range from
10–15, 15–25, and 20–25 knots for tanker, cargo, and passenger vessels, respectively.
Accordingly, cargo vessels, the most numerous vessel type in our study and the type most
Silber et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.399 11/17named in enforcement actions, were required to make significant shifts in operations to
comply with the speed regulation. Relative to cargo and passenger vessels, tankers needed
to make the smallest changes in speeds to comply with the regulation, and it appears the
approach taken by this vessel class was to reduce speeds when traveling through active
SMAs(asreflectedintheirPDGT10values),but,nottoapointoffullcompliance.
The highest compliance rates were observed in the latter active periods, with notable
changes occurring in the third season. Given the timing of the first set of NOVAs, these
results suggest, but do not confirm, that the issuing of citations strongly influenced
the behavior of notified vessels/companies. In addition, although they were issued to a
fraction of the regulated community, citations appear to have improved compliance in
the regulated population as a whole. This is consistent with findings by others whereby
environmental monitoring and enforcement activities had a strong impact not only in
reducing future violations (Gray & Shimshack, 2011), but also that deterrence resulting
from these activities was almost as strong in affecting the compliance of others in the
regulated community as it was on the sanctioned entity (Shimshack & Ward, 2005).
Assessing internal business actions is beyond the scope of this study, but anecdotal
reports to us indicate that there was broad knowledge among maritime industries that
citations/fines were being issued. In addition, OLE press releases and industry trade
publications notified readers about the issuing of fines and named the violator’s company.
Societal expectations, perceived social costs, and the importance of reputation have been
identified as motivators in corporate compliance behavior (May, 2005; Gunningham,
Thornton&Kagan,2005),andthesefactorsmayhavebeenatplayinourstudy.
Each of the targeted notification programs appeared to have at least some effect on
improved compliance in individual vessels. There are important distinctions between
these programs that may be reflected in their relative effectiveness. An at-sea hailing
incident may have been known only to the vessel operator and this program was limited
geographically and temporally. Its modest influence on compliance suggests that when
the perceived likelihood of detection is low (no visible enforcement entity present on the
majority of trips) the threat of adverse consequences is also low. Receipt of NOVAs or
monthly summaries of operations to association members (and perhaps COPPS letters)
wasalmostcertainlyknownthroughoutagivencompany(inmostcases,companyofficials
weretheentitiesbeingnotified)whichmayhaveledtocompany-widedirectivesregarding
compliance. CSA members comprise a diverse set of vessel types, tankers being strongly
represented; likely, minimal alteration of operations was needed for many of these vessels
to comply. In addition, many CSA-member vessels are engaged largely in domestic trade
and in making repeated U.S. port entries may have been exposed to a greater degree than
othervesselstoawareness-raisingabouttherestrictions.
Multiple notification/enforcement programs can have an additive value in influencing
compliance rates (Gray & Shimshack, 2011) and the threat of punitive actions may bolster
the effectiveness of non-punitive measures (Abbot , 2009; Scholz & Gray, 1990). We note
that shortly after NOVAs were issued the industry associations sought to develop regular
non-compliance notification programs for their members. Therefore, these follow-up
Silber et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.399 12/17programslikelycomplimentedenforcementactionsandprovidedperiodicremindersthat
operationswerebeingroutinelymonitored.
Enforcement activities can be labor- and resource-intensive and may be difficult if the
regulated population is large or widely dispersed (Abbot , 2009; Ali & Abdullah, 2010).
Where feasible, remote-monitoring can be a cost-effective means to improve compliance
(Purdy, 2010). Whereas we did not attempt to quantify agency costs involved in the
monitoring/enforcement activities described here, by utilizing an existing infrastructure
for remote monitoring and relying on electronic means or surface mail for nearly all
enforcement and notification activities, costs were almost certainly considerably less than
thoseinvolvedinconventionalinspectionorlawenforcementactivities.
The vessel speed restrictions appear to be working as intended: no fatal vessel
strike-related right whale deaths were reported in or near active SMAs since the rule went
into effect, a period that is nearly twice the longest interval between subsequent known
vessel collision fatalities in these same areas in an 18-year study period prior to adoption
of the rule (Laist, Knowlton & Pendleton, 2014). Modeling studies have indicated that the
riskoffatalvesselcollisionsofrightwhaleshasbeenreducedbythevesselspeedrestriction
(Lagueux et al., 2011; Wiley et al., 2011). The probability (a 80–90% reduction in risk) of
fatal vessel collisions was lowest in the latter part of the period in which the rule was in
effect(Conn&Silber,2013),duringwhichimprovedcompliancerateswereobserved.
Voluntary actions and incentives are approaches that have been widely used and can
be effective in reducing environmental impacts (Dietz & Stern, 2002; Gunningham, Kagan
& Thornton, 2004; Stafford, 2012). However, in regard to the conservation issue of vessel
strikes of large whales, mandatory and enforced changes in vessel operations appear to
have considerable conservation value while adherence to—and therefore effectiveness
of—previouslyimplementedvoluntarymeasurestoreducewhaledisturbance(Wileyetal.,
2008)andvessel/whalecollisions(Silber,Adams&Bettridge,2012)waslow.
Costs incurred in issuing and enforcing living resource conservation regulations and
costs to regulated entities might be assessed relative to societal benefits (Gren & Li, 2011).
Economic impacts to the regulated community arising from vessel speed restrictions
(including the effect of lost time, indirect impacts to intermodal transport systems etc.)
are a fraction of the value of the goods and services provided by the affected maritime and
associated industries (Nathan Associates Inc., 2012), and these might be weighed in the
contextofsocietalvaluationstudiesofthevirtuesofpreservingendangeredandthreatened
species(e.g.,Wallmo&Lew,2011).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study provides information about the relative roles of punitive and non-punitive tar-
getedactionsdesignedtoenhancecompliance.Ourfindings,likethoseofothers,appearto
stronglysuggestthatcitations/finesweremotivatorsinimprovingcompliantbehaviorand
thesemayhavebeenbackedbytargetednotificationsofviolation.Progressivelyimproving
complianceratesappearedtohavebeeninfluenced,tovaryingdegrees,bybroad-scaleno-
tification programs and the threat (or reality) of enforcement activities. These results may
Silber et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.399 13/17helpinformulatingmanagementstrategiesforthisparticularconservationconcernandin
improvingcomplianceinvirtuallyanysettinginwhichregulatorycomplianceissought.
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